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"PAY FOR DELAY": LEGITIMATE 
CONDUCT TO DEFEND VALID PATENT 
RIGHTS OR ANTICOMPETITIVE 
BEHAVIOUR?  
Molly Anning* 
Originator and generic drug manufacturers frequently settle patent litigation on terms that include a 
payment to the generic manufacturer in return for the generic to delay entry into the market. These 
reverse-payment settlements extend the originator's market exclusivity and can amount to 
anticompetitive divisions of the market. Proponents of such settlements emphasise the reverse-
payment as a legitimate business response to the risks associated with litigation. While reverse-
payment settlements have raised considerable debate in the pharmaceutical field in both the United 
States and the European Union, competition authorities in New Zealand are yet to address this issue. 
Against this background, this article seeks to analyse the compatibility of such settlements with New 
Zealand competition law, in particular with ss 27 and 36 of the Commerce Act 1986. Given the 
diversity of such agreements, it is unclear whether New Zealand competition law is adequate to curtail 
reverse-payment settlements.  
I INTRODUCTION 
In the pharmaceutical industry, originators are manufacturers which develop new pharmaceutical 
products. Generics manufacture bioequivalent versions of drugs which an originator initially 
developed. In researching and developing new medicines, originators obtain a range of patents to 
protect these medicines against generic competition. Competing generic companies scout 
opportunities to challenge the validity of patents or may enter a market at the risk of infringing the 
originator's exclusive rights. These competing incentives often culminate in patent litigation. Reverse-
payment settlements are a form of resolution attractive to risk-averse parties. The legality of such 
settlements has made it difficult for competition lawyers to advise and such a settlement has yet to 
come before a New Zealand court.  
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The impetus for this article derives from a concern that some powerful pharmaceutical companies 
are hiding behind patent protection to preserve monopoly profits and delay the entry of generic 
competitors. Where an anticompetitive agenda exists, consumers are impacted through increased 
public expenditure on medicines and reduced consumer choice of alternative medicines.1 These 
behind-the-curtain power alliances between a bully originator and a greedy generic hedging its bets 
with litigation must be extinguished.  
The complexity of the pharmaceutical market and the interplay of intellectual property and 
competition law form the themes for this article. First, an introduction to the New Zealand 
pharmaceutical industry, intellectual property scheme and the effects of generic entry is given to set 
the scene for the following analysis. Second, this article will discuss how ss 27 and 36 of the 
Commerce Act 1986 apply to reverse-payment settlements. Drawing upon decisions from the United 
States, the European Union and Australia, this article assesses whether the current law adequately 
curtails such unilateral conduct. It challenges conventional interpretations of these provisions and 
encourages a new approach in light of unique pharmaceutical industry characteristics, based on the 
following conclusions:  
(1) The current approach to market definition is problematic in the pharmaceutical industry.  
(2) To assess the potential net effect of such settlements on market competition, an ex ante 
inquiry into patent validity/infringement is crucial. 
(3) Section 27 will be violated only where the challenged agreement contains restrictions on 
competition that exceed the exclusionary potential of the patent and the likelihood of 
originator success in the patent dispute is low. 
(4) The counterfactual test, under s 36, continues to cause problems when analysing the 
behaviour of originator pharmaceutical companies. 
This article looks at the application of the law to claims where there is an anticompetitive purpose 
and/or effect. It does not consider legitimate challenges, weak patents or genuine patent infringement. 
This article focuses on the pharmaceutical sector. Its conclusions will also apply to other industries.  
  
1 OECD Secretariat Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee: Executive 
Summary of the Discussion on Competition and Generic Pharmaceuticals (DEP/CAF/COMP/M(2014)2/ 
ANN6/FINAL, 10 February 2015) at 2. 
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II THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND GENERIC ENTRY 
A Prescription Medicine Supply Chain  
New Zealand's pharmaceutical supply chain is complex. It includes manufacturers (originators 
and generics), the Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC), District Health Boards, 
wholesalers, Community Pharmacies and consumers:2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The New Zealand Medicines and Medical Safety Authority approves and registers 
pharmaceuticals.3 Once the Ministry of Health sets a budget, PHARMAC manages pharmaceutical 
spending.4 Pharmaceuticals which meet eligibility criteria and receive subsidised funding from 
PHARMAC become listed on the Pharmaceutical Schedule.5 PHARMAC's role in New Zealand is 
distinct. Overseas, wholesalers typically engage directly with manufacturers.6  
B Intellectual Property Protection  
The pharmaceutical industry is innovative and high-technology, heavily reliant upon the 
protections patents afford. Innovation by originators is crucial to developing new medicines against 
  
2 Deloitte Environmental Scan Regarding Drug Margins (January 2015) at 8. 
3  At 8. 
4  At 8. 
5  At 8.  
6  At 13. 
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different illnesses. Developing a new drug takes an average of 12 years,7 and it can cost over NZD 
3.6 billion.8 The cost is typically 15–18 per cent of sales revenue.9 Patent protection guarantees some 
return on the originator's research and development investment. 
In New Zealand, a patent has a life of 20 years from the date of the patent application.10 Unlike 
Australia and the United States, New Zealand does not offer any patent term extension.11 The process 
to obtain Medsafe's approval for marketing a pharmaceutical is lengthy and can reduce the "effective 
patent term" below the 20 years in the Patents Act 2013.12 Pharmaceutical companies argue this 
reduces their ability to recoup their investment in developing pharmaceuticals and minimises any 
incentive to continue doing so.13 
A patent creates a legal monopoly as a source of exclusive rights to make, use, sell or otherwise 
deal in the invention in New Zealand.14 This does not conflict with competition law, as the object of 
both is to promote innovation and competition.15 A pharmaceutical patent provides a sufficient degree 
of protection to ensure the development of new drugs, without making it difficult for competitors to 
enter the market.16 The promise of monopoly rents creates "in-market" competition between 
originators to bring the first (or most effective) treatments to the market.17 An originator patents a 
  
7  Medicines New Zealand "Examining medicines: Generic versus biologic – Patent term versus Data 
Protection" <www.medicinesnz.co.nz>. 
8  International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations "The Pharmaceutical Industry and 
Global Health: Facts and Figures 2017" (2017) <www.ifpma.org> at 8.  
9  Researched Medicines Industry Association of New Zealand Inc "Submission to the Commerce Committee 
on the Patents Bill" at [3].  
10  Patents Act 2013, s 20. 
11  Tim Jackson "Extension of Patent Term in New Zealand" (17 May 2016) Baldwins Intellectual Property & 
Patent Attorneys <www.baldwins.com>. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Act 2016 
provides a 20-year patent term extension, although this legislation is not yet in force.  
12  Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Regulatory Impact Statement: Analysis of Options 
Relating to Implementation of Certain Intellectual Property Obligations under the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (April 2016) at [4].  
13  At [45].  
14  James F Ponsoldt and W Hennen Ehrenclou "The Antitrust Legality of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation 
Settlements" [2006] University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy 37 at 38.  
15  OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee: Generic Pharmaceuticals 
– Note by the Delegation of India (DAF/COMP/WD(2014)72, 28 May 2014) at 3. 
16  At 3.  
17  Colette Downie "Strategically Deterring Generic Entry Ahead of Patent Expiry: A Competition Law 
Antidote? Assessing Australian Pharmaceutical Antirust Enforcement after ACCC v Pfizer" (2017) 45 ABLR 
75 at 82. 
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particular active ingredient or production process. It is not until the patent expires that other 
manufacturers can make generic medicines using the same active ingredient or production process.  
While patentees can defend valid patent rights, the validity of these rights can be a trigger for 
litigation. Where settlements eventuate, particular clauses may attract competition law scrutiny, 
especially where the settlement delays or prevents a generic entering into the market.  
C Generic Entry 
The intricacy of the pharmaceutical industry is accompanied by an event with drastic implications 
for an originator: generic entry. Generics can enter a drug market in only a few circumstances: 
(1) on expiry of the originator drug's patent term;18 
(2) with a licence from the originator patentee;  
(3) if an originator's patent is invalid or not infringed;19 or  
(4) at the risk of infringing a patent. 
In New Zealand, manufacturers competitively tender for exclusive rights to supply pharmacies 
with generic medicines.20 This process includes almost half of subsidised pharmaceuticals in New 
Zealand (by volume), which represents 20 per cent of total pharmaceuticals costs and generates 
around NZD 40–60 million in savings per annum.21 PHARMAC has developed one of the lowest 
pharmaceutical cost structures in the developed world.22 The strategy has been to "wait out" patents 
of new and innovative medicines and fund generic substitutes.23 This model has eroded intellectual 
property rights of originators and reduced incentives to innovate.24 This regulatory climate 
incentivises originators to turn to their own devices in protecting their investment in research and 
development and encourages generics to either challenge patent validity or enter the market at risk of 
infringing a patent.  
  
18  At 83.  
19  Rebecca Eisenberg and Daniel Crane "Patent Punting: How FDA and Antitrust Courts Undermine the Hatch-
Waxman Act to Avoid Dealing with Patents" (2015) 21 MTTLR 197 at 229.  
20  Deloitte, above n 2, at 8.  
21  At 8.  
22  Researched Medicines Industry Association of New Zealand Inc, above n 9, at [3]. 
23  At [3].  
24  For drugs developed by overseas companies, New Zealand will likely comprise a very small part of their total 
target market. Therefore, the New Zealand system is unlikely to have a major chilling effect on their 
investment in research and development.  
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Entry of a generic enhances competition by driving prices down and providing choice between 
prescription medicine brands to the benefit of consumers and governments.25 On a generic's entry 
price falls on average 85 per cent below the brand price before generic entry,26 impacting the 
originator's market share and profits.27 For example, a 100-pill bottle of the antibiotic ciprofloxacin 
that cost USD 322 fell after generic entry to USD 14, a 95 per cent difference in price.28 This 
immediate decline in revenue after patent expiration is called a "patent cliff".29 This incentivises 
originator's to prevent or delay generic entry to defend revenue and maximise profits.30  
Originators have invested a considerable amount of effort in developing elaborate strategies for 
dealing with and delaying the consequences of generic entry. New Zealand patent law does not allow 
patentees to extend their patent.31 Rather than relying on the intellectual property scheme to preserve 
or extend exclusive rights and delay generic entry, originators could be more inclined to pursue 
anticompetitive tactics. 
III REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
Generics may find it profitable to challenge the patentee's exclusive rights before patent 
expiration, by either entering the market or suing the patent holder challenging the patent's validity.32 
Following publication of a patent, there is a three-month period where interested parties can object to 
the grant of the application.33 Proceedings occur in the High Court when challenging a patent existing 
for longer than a year.34 Comparatively, a generic entering the market prior to patent expiry may face 
an infringement action from the patentee. Conflicting incentives of originator and generic companies 
  
25  Hans Lofgren "Generic Medicines in Australia: Business Dynamics and Recent Policy Reform" (2009) 2 
SMR 24. 
26  Michael A Carrier "Pharmaceutical Antitrust Law in the United States" in Giovanni Pitruzella and Gabriella 
Muscolo (eds) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector: An International Perspective  
(Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2016) 477 at 479. 
27  Lofgren, above n 25, at 24. 
28  Re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation 363 F Supp 2d 514 (ED NY 2005) as cited in Carrier, 
above n 26, at 479. 
29  Chie Hoon Song and Jeung-Whan Han "Patent cliff and strategic switch: exploring strategic design 
possibilities in the pharmaceutical industry" (2016) 5 Springerplus 692 at 692. 
30  OECD Secretariat, above n 1, at 4.  
31 Jackson, above n 11.  
32  Zhenghui Wang "Reanalyzing Reverse-Payment Settlements: A Solution to the Patentee's Dilemma" (2014) 
99 Cornell L Rev 1227 at 1228. 
33  Patent Regulations 2014, reg 93.  
34  James & Wells "Challenging a patent application or granted patent" <www.jaws.co.nz>. 
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increase the likelihood of litigation and therefore settlements between the parties. These settlements 
often involve a reverse-payment.  
Reverse-payment settlements occur when a generic company enters, or threatens to enter, the 
market before the expiry of the patent. To avoid early competition, patent invalidation or costly and 
lengthy litigation, the originator and generic company reach a settlement.35 The originator pays a 
generic to delay the launch of its generic version.36 
These entry restrictions may look like, but are not limited to, the following:37 
(a) a generic company delays entry until the patent's expiry or a negotiated entry date; 
(b) the generic company agrees not to challenge the validity of the originator company's patent; 
(c) a licence from an originator company limits the generic firm's ability to market its own 
product; and/or 
(d) a distribution or supply agreement between the originator and generic limits the latter's ability 
to market its product. 
Although courts typically encourage settlements, the legality of those involving reverse-payments 
is concerning. If the generic company would have entered the market, but for the agreement, a 
payment by a market incumbent to restrict a potential competitor looks like an obvious collusion to 
circumvent competition.38 This is particularly concerning when the originator and generic company 
benefit from the agreement at the expense of the consumer. The originator shares patent revenues with 
the generic challenger, despite delayed generic entry.39 A further concern is whether the infringement 
or patent invalidity claim has merit or whether such settlements are a "thin camouflage" for improper 
collusion to delay competition.40 
Reverse-payment settlements have received extensive academic and judicial consideration in the 
United States and the European Union. The scant evidence of their existence in New Zealand likely 
arises from their inherently confidential nature, which increases the difficulty for the Commerce 
Commission in detecting "suspect transactions".41 Along with New Zealand being much smaller and 
  
35  Robin Feldman and Evan Frondorf "Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay" (2016) 
53 Harv J on Legis 499 at 510. 
36  Ponsoldt and Ehrenclou, above n 14, at 37.  
37  Ginevra Bruzzone and Sara Capozzi "The Procompetitive and Anticompetitive Impact of Patent Settlements" 
in Giovanni Pitruzella and Gabriella Muscolo (eds) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector: An International Perspective (Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2016) 15 at 20.  
38 Eisenberg and Crane, above n 19, at 229.  
39 OECD Secretariat, above n 1, at 6.  
40 Downie, above n 17, at 105. 
41 At 105. 
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with far less litigation than the United States, there is also less scope for reverse-payment settlements 
due to the lack of patent extension provisions in New Zealand. 
A Where Things Get Complicated 
Competition law's role and the standard of review is controversial in the face of uncertainty. Two 
scenarios illustrate this. 
Scenario A 
This scenario assumes the patent's validity and entry of a generic would infringe an 
originator's intellectual property rights. Any agreement excluding the generic until patent 
expiry would be consistent with the originator's exclusive rights.42 This does not restrict 
competition, as a generic infringing upon an intellectual property right cannot be a 
competitor of the originator patentee.  
Scenario B 
This scenario concerns agreements aimed to delay products from entering the market 
which fall outside the scope of the patent and are not protected by the originator's 
intellectual property rights. Here, conflict exists between intellectual property rights and 
competition law. Such an agreement will restrict competition. 
The closest New Zealand came to making a reverse-payment settlement inquiry was the 
Commission's Metal Roof Flashings Investigation Report in 2015.43 The Commission warned 
Consolidated Alloys about an anticompetitive clause in an agreement to settle intellectual property 
litigation. Although the Commission has not received any complaint in relation to reverse-payment 
agreements, its decision to take enforcement against Consolidated Alloys could signal a willingness 
to take cases where intellectual property and competition law intersect.44 
B Anticompetitive Effects of Reverse-Payment Settlements 
There is an argument that reverse-payment settlements are objectively anticompetitive because 
originators are permitted to exclude potential rivals.45 Harm to consumers arises because if litigation 
occurred, a court could hold the patent was invalid or not infringed. This would allow a generic to 
enter, increasing competition and lowering prices.46 PHARMAC subsidises prescribed medicines, 
  
42  Eisenberg and Crane, above n 19, at 229.  
43 Commerce Commission Metal Roof Flashings (Investigation Report, project no 11.02/14923, 5 October 
2015) at 21.  
44  Elisha Kemp, Troy Pilkington and Sarah Keene "When rights go wrong: Commerce Commission issues 
warning to Consolidated Alloys" (9 October 2015) Russell McVeagh <www.russellmcveagh.com>. 
45  Wang, above n 32, at 1241. 
46  Ponsoldt and Ehrenclou, above n 14, at 55. 
 LEGITIMATE CONDUCT TO DEFEND VALID PATENT RIGHTS OR ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR? 33 
 
33 
therefore weighing on the public health budget. The prospect of cheaper prices for consumers is lost 
as a product of avoiding litigation.47 Opponents of reverse-payment settlements equate the "reversed" 
flow of the settlement payments with conspiracy to divide the market.48 A reverse-payment may be 
economically rational where the net present value of settlement exceeds that of litigation for both 
parties.49 Industry-specific regulation undermines patent policy in the context of industry-specific 
reverse-payment settlements.50 Regulatory protection already benefits originators; the Commission 
should scrutinise synthetic legal devices which extend protection and the brand should bear the burden 
to rebut that presumption.51 The inelasticity of the pharmaceutical drug market, offering few 
substitutes to drugs needed to live and stay healthy, further supports stricter scrutiny of such 
settlements.52  
C Legitimate Business Conduct 
To comprehend the dynamics of reverse-payment settlements, understanding the competing risks 
both the originator and generic company bear in litigation is crucial. These settlements are attractive 
to originators who risk losing a patent infringement action and a new entrant disrupting their patent 
monopoly.53 Risk-averse parties are likely to settle.54 This is not necessarily because the patent case 
is weak, it is also possible the patentee considers the patent so valuable it is willing to pay a substantial 
premium to avoid even a slight chance of invalidity.55 Settlements avoid litigation costs and diversion 
of other internal resources.56 Determining patent validity is costly and lengthy, particularly with 
pharmaceuticals.57 The ability to settle is equated with insurance to foster innovation resulting in 
  
47  C Scott Hemphill "Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem" 
(2006) 81 NYU L Rev 1553 at 1557.  
48  Anjan Chatterji and Xiang Yu "Why Brand Pharmaceutical Companies Choose to Pay Generics in Settling 
Patent Disputes: A Systematic Evaluation of Asymmetric Risks in Litigation" (2011) 10 Nw J Tech & Intell 
Prop 19 at 24.  
49  At 24.  
50  Hemphill, above n 47, at 1561–1567.  
51  At 1561 and 1615.  
52  Ponsoldt and Ehrenclou, above n 14, at 55. 
53  At 55.  
54  Eisenberg and Crane, above n 19, at 229.  
55  At 238. 
56  Keith M Drake, Martha A Starr and Thomas McGuire "Do 'Reverse-payment' Settlements of Brand-Generic 
Patent Disputes in the Pharmaceutical Industry Constitute an Anticompetitive Pay for Delay?"  (Working 
Paper 20292, National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2014). 
57  Chatterji and Yu, above n 48, at 32.  
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procompetitive effects in the long term.58 Without this insurance, risk-averse originators will be 
reluctant to invest capital into research and development.59 There appears to be a trade-off between 
preserving consumer prices for existing products and stimulating research and production of future 
products.60 Additionally, empirical data suggests the impact of reverse-payment settlements can 
sometimes be minimal or neutral.61 A reverse-payment settlement should be illegal only when its 
anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive benefits. Some scholars argue risk management 
should not be an admissible justification because allowing reverse-payments that foster such risk-
averse decisions inefficiently lowers shareholder returns and incentives to invest in innovation.62 
Evaluation of the economic benefit suggests both parties usually prefer settlement with reverse-
payment over litigation.63 In assessing United States courts of appeal cases, Chatterji and Yu find 
reverse-payment settlements are consistent with risk aversion and no collusion is necessary for a brand 
to make a rational decision to pay the generic.64 
IV NEW ZEALAND: RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND 
EXEMPTIONS 
Part 2 of the Commerce Act prohibits restrictive trade practices. The Act's purpose is to promote 
competition in markets for the long-term benefit of consumers.65 Section 27 proscribes the provision 
of a contract, arrangement or understanding if it has the purpose or effect or likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition in a market. Section 36 prohibits a person with a substantial degree 
of power in a market from taking advantage of that power for the purposes of restricting the entry of 
a person into that or any other market, preventing or deterring a person from engaging in competitive 
conduct in that market or eliminating a person from that or any other market. Sections 27 and 36 are 
key instruments for testing the competition boundaries of reverse-payment settlements.66  
  
58  James Langenfeld and Wenqing Li "Intellectual Property and Agreements to Settle Patent Disputes: The Case 
of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded to Generic Drug Manufacturers" (2003) 70 ALJ 777 
at 808. 
59  Chatterji and Yu, above n 48, at 32. 
60 Langenfeld and Li, above n 58, at 778. 
61  Henry Butler and Jeffrey Jarosch "Policy Reversal on Reverse-payments: Why Court Should Not Follow the 
New DOH Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation" (2010) 96 Iowa L 
Rev 57 at 112–113.  
62  Thomas G McGuire and others "Resolving Reverse-Payment Settlements with the Smoking Gun of Stock 
Price Movement" (2016) 81 Iowa L Rev 1581 at 1586.  
63  Chatterji and Yu, above n 48, at 19. 
64  At 20. 
65  Commerce Act 1986, s 1A. 
66  In August 2017, s 30 was "expanded" to explicitly prohibit capacity withholding and market sharing. A 
reverse-payment settlement is an agreement not to enter a market/withhold capacity. In practice, the 
 LEGITIMATE CONDUCT TO DEFEND VALID PATENT RIGHTS OR ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR? 35 
 
35 
The Act has two intellectual property exemptions. Section 45 establishes a limited safe harbour 
for certain licensing practices where the intellectual property holder does not have a substantial degree 
of market power. There is no case law on this exemption and the Ministry of Business Innovation and 
Employment did not consider the matter in its Targeted Review of the Commerce Act 1986.67 Sumpter, 
Hamlin and Mellsop suggest this is likely driven by the common belief among practitioners and the 
Commission that an intellectual property licence by itself is unlikely to hinder competition rules.68 
Section 36(3) provides an exemption from the misuse of market power provision only for conduct 
seeking to enforce a statutory intellectual property right. It remains unclear whether the protection 
offered by s 36(3) is as broad as it appears. The only decision mentioning the provision is Telecom 
Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd in a strike out application.69 The High 
Court interpreted s 36(3) to allow an intellectual property right holder to file proceedings and enforce 
its intellectual property rights. This section is unlikely to assist parties who have entered a reverse-
payment settlement.  
The Commerce Act is based upon Australia's Trade Practices Act 1974 (now called the Consumer 
and Competition Act 2010).70 It is appropriate to draw upon Australian commentary and judicial 
decisions when assessing how ss 27 and 36 apply to reverse-payment settlements in New Zealand. 
A The Market 
It is important to define the parameters of the market in which the defendant product competes. 
As Burchett J in News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd observed "the identification of 
too narrow or too broad a market will completely distort the picture gained of the competitive forces 
at work".71  
The Act defines a market as a market in New Zealand for goods and services as well as other 
goods and services that are substitutable as a matter of fact and commercial common sense.72 The 
leading judgment from the Trade Practices Commission in Re Queensland Co-Op Milling Assoc Ltd 
and Defiance Holdings Ltd defined a market as "the area of close competition between firms".73 New 
  
Commission takes far more cases under s 30, because it does not have to prove "substantial lessening of 
competition". The Commission would likely take any reverse-payment settlement action under this section.  
67  Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Targeted Review of the Commerce Act 1986 (2015). 
68 Matt Sumpter, Ben Hamlin and James Mellsop New Zealand Competition Law and Policy (Wolter Kluwer, 
Auckland, 2010) at 1208. 
69  At 1208; and Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 247 
(HC).  
70 Lindsay Hampton and Paul Scott Guide to Competition Law (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013) at 75. 
71 News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd [1996] FCA 1256, (1996) 135 ALR 33 at [83].  
72  Commerce Act, s 3(1A). 
73  Re Queensland Co-Op Milling Assoc Ltd and Defiance Holdings Ltd (1976) 8 ALR 481 (TPC) at 517. 
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Zealand courts have adopted the "SSNIP" (small, yet significant non-transitory increase in price) 
test.74 The United States Department of Justice pioneered the test in the 1982 Merger Guidelines. It 
has become a worldwide standard for defining markets and is in the Commerce Commission's 
Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines.  
The test defines the relevant market as the smallest set of products or services within which a 
hypothetical profit-maximising sole supplier of a good or service would find it profitable to increase 
prices by 5–10 per cent from a competitive price level for at least a year (avoiding cellophane 
fallacy).75 The test is repeated until a market is found where it would be profitable to impose a 
SSNIP.76 Delineation of the five dimensions of a market involve separate applications of the SSNIP 
test. These dimensions are: product/service, geographic, functional, temporal and customer.77 There 
may be potential competitors who can enter the market quickly in response to a SSNIP, if so, there 
will be supply-side substitution.78 Supply-side substitution or new entry seems an irrelevant 
consideration in the pharmaceutical context, given the originator (and patent holder) is likely to be 
the only supplier in New Zealand.  
The SSNIP test is unsuitable in a monopolisation context because the test assumes existing 
competitive prices.79 A monopolist might have set its prices at such a high level that further price 
increase above current prices would not be profitable.80 This is commonly referred to as the 
"cellophane fallacy".81 Applying the SSNIP test here would lead to too wide a market definition and 
a likely finding that the firm does not possess substantial market power.82  
The pharmaceutical industry's unique nature challenges the applicability of the SSNIP test in New 
Zealand. Many assumptions underlying the SSNIP test do not apply. First, an originator preserves a 
legal monopoly until patent expiration. Second, prices in New Zealand drugs markets are subject to 
regulation by PHARMAC with monopsony power. Drug companies cannot set prices or raise them 
  
74  New Zealand Bus Ltd v Commerce Commission [2007] NZCA 502, [2008] 3 NZLR 433 at [202].  
75  Commerce Commission Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines (July 2013) at [3.18].  
76  At [3.18].  
77  Hampton and Scott, above n 70, at 70–73. 
78  At 64. 
79  At 73. 
80  At 74. 
81  United States v El du Pont de Nemours & Co 351 US 377 (1956).  
82  Massimo Motta Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) at 
105.  
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over time.83 Third, in the case of prescription drugs, consumer preferences do not determine 
substitutability. Since the doctor is the ultimate decision maker, there is very limited price 
sensitivity.84 Applying the SSNIP test in the pharmaceutical context is unlikely to provide much 
insight into competition dynamics of the relevant market. 
In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Pfizer Australia Pty Ltd, the High Court 
of Australia accepted the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's characterisation of the 
relevant market as the "Australia-wide 'market' for the supply of atorvastatin to, and acquisition of 
atorvastatin by, community pharmacies."85 The Court accepted that although generic manufacturers 
often sell "ranges" of products, atorvastatin was sold as a separate pharmaceutical product for which 
there was no substitute.86 Re Aggrenox Antitrust Litigation filled the gap left by the Supreme Court 
Federal Trade Commission v Actavis Inc decision in defining the market.87 The Court determined the 
relevant market "by the nature of the challenged agreement", and concluded the only relevant market 
was that for Aggrenox and its generic equivalent and did not include therapeutic competitors.88 This 
narrow approach to market definition will provide an indication of the originator's market power. This 
is consistent with the High Court's observation in Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v 
Commerce Commission that "a mechanical reliance upon substitution criteria in a contextual vacuum 
is not sufficient".89 Market definition is a tool for competition analysis, not an end in itself.90 
In light of the above, a market definition assessment when considering pharmaceutical entry 
should include the following three aspects. First, a court should consider evidence of therapeutic 
substitutes to restrict the "choice set" to the compounds doctors regard as substitutable for treating a 
specific condition.91 Second, a court needs evidence of prescribing patterns among doctors to provide 
realistic indications of the functional substitutability of two drugs prescribed for the same condition. 
Third, a court requires evidence of the impact of different competitive strategies on sales of a specific 
  
83  Charles River Associates "Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Sector" (November 2006) 
<http://ecp.crai.com>. 
84  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Secretariat The role of competition in the 
pharmaceutical sector and its benefits for consumers (TD/RBP/CONF.8/3, 2015) at 5. 
85  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Pfizer Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 113, (2015) 323 
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product to understand the patterns of substitution among different prescription drugs.92 This 
methodology of defining pharmaceutical sector markets takes into account the industry's unique 
features.  
B Section 27 
Section 27 prohibits a firm from entering into or giving effect to a provision of an agreement that 
has the purpose or effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. The limbs 
of s 27 are disjunctive and capture conduct the others relevant sections will not.93 First, a court will 
encounter the difficulty of defining the relevant market. This is discussed above. Second, depending 
on how a plaintiff has put their case, a court will undertake an analysis under the relevant limb or 
limbs of s 27.  
1 Purpose 
The purpose inquiry under s 27 requires an objective assessment94 of the substantial purpose of 
the provision.95 Evidence of subjective purpose may inform the analysis in circumstances where it is 
"borderline as to whether there might be an anti-competitive effect".96 If it is obvious that purpose is 
unascertainable on implementation of the provision, assessed objectively, the provision cannot have 
had that purpose.97  
Reverse-payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry, objectively, have an anticompetitive 
purpose. The majority in Actavis state "[i]f the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to share patent-
generated monopoly profits, then, in absence of some other justification, the anti-trust laws are likely 
to forbid the arrangement."98 Despite being a reality of the patent system, which motivates and 
rewards innovators for new inventions, the exclusion of competitors to maintain patent-generated 
monopoly profits carries with it an anticompetitive purpose. Risk management justifications may also 
reveal an intention to substantially lessen competition. Settlements typically insure against the 
possibility of an adverse outcome, which in the context of patent litigation is increased competition 
  
92  At 2.   
93  Paul Scott "The Purpose of Substantially Lessening Competition: The Divergence Between New Zealand and 
Australian Law" (2011) 19 Wai L Rev 168 at 172.  
94  New Zealand authorities differ on the approach to purpose under s 27. The majority judgment of Glazebrook 
J confirmed an objective assessment: ANZCO Foods Waitara Ltd v AFFCO New Zealand Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 
351 (CA).  
95  Commerce Act, s 2(5).  
96  ANZCO, above n 94, at [261]. 
97  At [257]. 
98  Actavis, above n 87, at 2236–2237. 
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for the originator.99 Where parties are aware of the likelihood of success of patent litigation, this 
suggests either a genuine settlement to avoid litigation risks or collusion to avoid competition. Any 
documents expressing concerns regarding competition law compliance in relation to "deals" being 
done with generic producers is another warning sign.100 
Evidentiary difficulties in substantiating an inference purpose case indicate careful documentation 
by originators of the procompetitive and risk management reasoning behind the reverse-payment 
settlement.101 These difficulties, coupled with evidence from credible senior decision makers, can 
effectively displace prejudicial inferences as to the substantial purpose behind the reverse-payment 
settlement.102 Pfizer demonstrated this.103 These assessments require reference to the parties' 
contemporaneous internal documents. This highlights the need for companies to ensure their internal 
documents properly reflect their actual position and intentions. Employees must understand the 
documents they create could be reviewed in the context of an investigation by a competition authority 
into suspected infringements of competition law.104  
Courts should be aware of surrounding circumstances which undermine the credibility of 
originators' subjective purposes for entering into a reverse-payment settlement. The United States 
Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp rejected the purported purposes 
of Skiing Co discontinuing the all-Aspen ticket, saying they were "pretextual".105 In the context of a 
pharmaceutical patent settlement courts should be wary of the following: 
(a) an agreement that restricts generic entry beyond patent expiry, without reasonable 
explanation; 
(b) large settlement payments which exceed expected litigation costs; 
(c) large settlement payments which exceed damages sought for potential patent infringement; 
and 
(d) inconsistent clauses within a settlement. 
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Since New Zealand does not offer patent extensions, a court should be more open to subjective 
intentions on the part of the originator who may consider the patent so valuable it is willing to pay a 
significant amount to avoid the slightest chance of invalidity.  
2 Effect or likely effect 
In determining whether the agreement has the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition, courts undertake a comparative analysis assessing the state of a hypothetical market with 
and without the relevant provision.106 This counterfactual analysis assesses the procompetitive and 
anticompetitive effects of a reverse-payment settlement and whether there is a net effect of 
substantially lessening competition.107 This test shares similarities with the "rule of reason" analysis 
the United States courts undertake.108 Glazebrook J in ANZCO Foods Waitara Ltd v AFFCO New 
Zealand Ltd (ANZCO) identifies a list of factors which courts should take into account.109 These 
factors include barriers to entry and rate of foreclosure of the market. Dandy Power Equipment Pty 
Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd requires a court to inquire about nature, extent and operation of the 
market.110  
An agreement to restrict, limit or prevent the acquisition or supply of a particular drug will stifle 
competition by allowing an originator to maintain monopoly prices and restrict consumer choice.111 
It is unclear how competitive a generic would be immediately on entry. Since doctors ultimately 
control consumer choice in the case of prescription drugs, changing prescribing patterns will follow 
with greater awareness and understanding of new medicines. Furthermore, consumer brand loyalty 
and fear of imperfect substitutability may extend an originator's ability to charge monopoly prices 
despite generic entry.112 
The difficulty a court will face inquiring into the state of competition in a market with and without 
a reverse-payment settlement is the question of patent validity or infringement. Without a reverse-
payment settlement, litigation has two possible outcomes. First, the patent is invalid and a generic 
will enter the market free from restraint. Second, the patent will be valid and the generic will either 
enter the market at risk of infringing the patent or wait until the patent expires. Since settlement avoids 
patent litigation, undertaking an analysis using competing hypothetical markets is speculative. This is 
  
106  ANZCO, above n 94, at [245]. 
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especially so when the potential state of the market is dependent upon the original patent dispute.  The 
Court in Actavis made clear the "rule of reason" analysis is not likely to require an assessment of the 
underlying patent action to decide whether a reverse-payment settlement is reasonable.113 This was 
because the majority equated a reverse-payment settlement with a weak infringement action.114 This 
is troubling when a settlement's "potential for genuine adverse effects on competition" is premised on 
the hypothetical that, had the patent been invalidated or not infringed, a large sum of revenues would 
have flowed to consumers in the form of lower drug prices.115  
This article encourages New Zealand courts to depart from the above reasoning. A court should 
consider ex ante evidence of patent validity or infringement to determine the likely state of 
competition in the market. To establish a prima facie case challenging a reverse-payment settlement, 
the party alleging illegality should provide proof, other than the payment itself, that the likelihood of 
the patent's enforceability is low.116 This does not entail a separate decision; rather, it entails a 
consideration of the likely outcome. To avoid a "mini trial", courts should accept a lower burden of 
proof. For a court to continue an analysis under s 27 the plaintiff must prove a court would "likely" 
find the patent invalid or not infringed. Courts will undertake a more satisfactory analysis in 
determining whether a settlement harms consumers if they are willing to examine the merits of the 
patent validity or infringement action, rather than rely on deceptive alternatives such as reverse-
payments and estimations about intent to avoid litigation risks. Notably, the Supreme Court (now the 
High Court) in Phillip Morris (New Zealand) Ltd v Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co (New Zealand) Ltd 
made clear an applicant need not establish a prima facie case on patent validity for an interim 
injunction.117 Expediency concerns associated with interim injunctions are not as prevalent in 
competition litigation and the anticompetitive effects of such conduct is the primary concern.  
A preliminary assessment of the patent validity claim can address the concern of whether 
infringement or patent invalidity claims hold merit, or whether such settlements are a "thin 
camouflage" for improper collusion to delay competition.118 The majority in Actavis cautioned that 
settlements of weak patent infringement actions, that would have otherwise been decided in the 
generic's favour, will leave consumers worse off than they would have been had the parties continued 
with litigation.119 Agreements with exclusions beyond the scope of the patent (for example, future 
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production processes not covered by the patent) and disproportionate settlement amounts provide 
greater clarity that the generic's willingness to desist from market entry is based upon financial 
incentives rather than an objective assessment of the strength of the patent.120 The scope of the patent 
can only be accurately ascertained by an inquiry into the enforceability of such patent.  
The Court in Actavis held anticompetitive effects are inferred if the amount of the reverse-payment 
exceeds the patent holder's anticipated litigation costs, absent some offsetting justification.121 For the 
Court, this was an indication of market power and obviated the need to inquire into the patent merits 
because the settlement exclusion period exceeded what was merited by the expected patent odds.122 
Applying this standard seems contentious. First, side deals and separate clauses can obscure reverse-
payment amounts. For example, an excessive payment may reflect compensation for other services 
provided by the generic company.123 Second, defendants argue the payments are a legitimate and 
justified method of risk aversion. Third, when calculating damages from the reverse-payment amount, 
one can infer only a highly conservative floor, as the calculations do not consider the patent holder 
has anything to gain from the settlement.124  
In 2015 the Commission released the Metal Roof Flashings Investigation Report which issued a 
warning to Consolidated Alloys that cl 8 of the Settlement Agreement breached s 27, as it had the 
purpose and likely effect of substantially lessening competition in the metal roof edge products market 
and the market for soft-edge flashing products, during a post-patent period.125 Clause 8 restricted 
Edging Systems Ltd from introducing any new soft-edge flashing products and applied beyond patent 
expiration.126 In assessing likely effect, the Commission considered the impact entry of a competitor 
would have on price and sales. This may be a difficult inquiry to undertake in the context of 
pharmaceuticals, as competition is sparse for an originator where a generic is yet to enter the market. 
Where an agreement restricts entry beyond the post-patent period a separate analysis considering 
competition in the market will need to be undertaken. In such circumstances, a settlement will go 
beyond legitimate conduct to protect a patent right and will have the effect of substantially lessening 
competition in the market.  
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Justice Glazebrook suggests if the firm affected is a small firm then there is unlikely to be 
substantial lessening of competition.127 Her Honour took issue with the fact that the encumbrance in 
ANZCO only affected a small competitor in a small part of the market.128 She noted s 27 is not 
concerned with the fate of individual competitors.129 While this holds truth, one of the ways in which 
parties to an agreement can substantially lessen competition is by practices which injure competitors 
and thereby injure the competitive process itself.130 Some firms are mavericks which have a 
disproportionate effect on the market.131 In a cosy oligopoly, entry of a maverick can shake things up 
and an agreement to stop a maverick entering can substantially lessen competition, irrespective of its 
small size.132 A generic is comparable to a maverick. Entry of such can have enormous effects by 
reducing drug price, on average 85 per cent below the brand price, and by increasing consumer 
choice.133 
C Section 36 
The other pivotal restrictive trade practices provision is s 36. There is a particular need for robust 
monopolisation provisions in small market economies such as New Zealand, where high levels of 
concentration exist.134 
McHugh J in Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
described the approach to s 36 as a sequential analysis:135  
[262] First, the court must identify the relevant market in which the conduct occurred. Second, the court 
must determine whether the alleged offender had a substantial degree of market power. Third, the court 
must determine whether the alleged offender has taken advantage of that market power. Finally, the 
alleged offender must have engaged in the conduct for one of the proscribed purposes. 
The courts' application of s 36 has attracted considerable criticism from academics. Most criticism 
circulated in response to the Supreme Court's interpretation in Commerce Commission v Telecom 
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Corporation of New Zealand Ltd (0867) of s 36 and "taking advantage" in light of alternative tests.136 
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss whether the counterfactual test is a manifestation of 
alternate tests or whether these tests exist independently. This Part will assess the likely application 
of s 36 to reverse-payment settlements and whether the comparative exercise, endorsed by the 
Supreme Court, provides an adequate framework for analysis.137  
1 Substantial market power 
In changing the threshold test from "dominant position" to "substantial degree of power in a 
market", policy makers intended to broaden s 36's applicability not only to monopolists but also to 
the main players in an oligopoly.138 The absence of constraint is the essence of market power.139 
While market power commonly refers to influence upon market price, conduct directed at excluding 
competition is another indicator.140 A dominant share of the market infers the existence of monopoly 
power.141 Where it is not possible or rational for new entrants to participate in the market, a firm can 
have market power.142  
An originator holds a legal monopoly over a particular drug for the patent term. No other 
pharmaceutical company can manufacture and supply a drug in breach of the originator's patent. In 
the pharmaceutical industry, substitutes are rarely available and patients requiring a particular drug 
are not in a position to choose an alternative or refuse treatment. Arguably, this power has been "thrust 
upon" them in an effort to protect investment in research and development.143 To some it may seem 
unjust to attach liability purely on this basis. Exclusive rights granted by a patent usually equates with 
market power and it would be unusual for a judge to find that an originator company lost substantial 
market power before patent expiry. Despite the above, Flick J in Pfizer concluded Pfizer's market 
power gradually decreased as a result of the preparatory activities competitors undertook in 
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anticipation of patent expiration.144 Accordingly, his Honour concluded that by January 2012, Pfizer's 
market power was no longer "substantial".145 Pfizer's patent expired in May 2012.146 Pfizer makes 
clear market power is not substantial unless it can be sustained over a "reasonable period of time".147 
The Court blurs the distinction between competitive restraints which reduce substantial market power, 
and constraints which result in a loss of substantial market power. PHARMAC's strategy incentivises 
generics to enter the market by "waiting out" patents and funding the generic substitutes.148 Since 
New Zealand's patent scheme does not offer extensions, a generic making preparations to introduce a 
bioequivalent drug will gain access to the market immediately on patent expiry. In such 
circumstances, an originator's market power prior to patent expiry, may diminish as the entry of a 
generic becomes unavoidable.   
The reasoning in Pfizer is unsatisfactory, stands in stark contrast to similar cases overseas and is 
unlikely to apply in the New Zealand context. First, the decision is at odds with how pharmaceutical 
monopolies operate. A patentee has the exclusive right to make, use, sell or otherwise deal in the 
invention in New Zealand until patent expiration.149 Second, while competition is inevitable it is 
difficult to see how the extent of preparations any generic competitor pursued could have sufficiently 
diminished the market power of an originator below "substantial", without infringing exclusive rights 
of the patentee. Third, an originator will not lose all its market power even on patent expiration.150 It 
is common for consumers to remain loyal to the brand, often out of fear the generic's chemical 
components will be inferior.151 For example, the patent on fluoxetine, a widely used antidepressant, 
expired in 2001.152 A consumer has the choice between the brand drug, Prozac, and a variety of 
generic versions.153 Despite this, Prozac sells for almost three times the price of generic fluoxetine.154 
The maintenance of this price differential can be attributed to consumers being dubious about the 
substitutability of the two pills.155 Fourth, in AstraZeneca v European Commission it was not until 
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AstraZeneca's market share dropped to between 61–75 per cent in each relevant country after generic 
entry that it lost dominance.156 In the United Kingdom, AstraZeneca's market share dropped from 100 
per cent to 64 per cent between 1991 and 1999.157 AstraZeneca also benefited significantly from its 
position as incumbent, and evidence of strong inertia in doctors' prescribing patterns and brand loyalty 
contributed to its continued dominance after competitor entry.158 These are crucial considerations for 
a New Zealand court, especially in a highly concentrated small market economy.  
A New Zealand court should depart from Flick J's reasoning in Pfizer and presume an originator 
will possess market power up until generic entry and/or patent expiration. This event marks the logical 
transition of the originator having substantial market power to something less substantial. In the 
pharmaceutical context, Bain argues patents act as long-term barriers to entry, where an originator 
can earn above normal profits without the threat of entry.159 Furthermore, the market share of an 
originator is likely to be close to 100 per cent.  Consistent with Miller J's reasoning in Commerce 
Commission v New Zealand Bus Ltd (No 2), where an originator patentee is able to persistently earn 
high profits over the term of its 20 year patent, this indicates substantial market power.160 In Actavis 
the Court indicated the threshold for proving market power would be a very low one, stating "[t]he 
size of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a [prospective] generic is a strong indicator 
of … power."161 A pharmaceutical monopolist facing threat of generic entry on the patent expiration, 
will not necessarily lose that market power once the uncertainty arises.162 Absent an "at risk" early 
generic entry or licence prior to patent expiry, an originator patentee in a one-product market will 
preserve substantial market power until patent expiry. Sections 18 and 140 of the Patents Act support 
this in defining what it means to infringe a patent as doing anything a patentee has exclusive right to 
do. These rights include making, hiring, selling or disposing of the product, or offering to do so, or 
using or importing the product or keeping the product for the purpose of doing any of the prior 
things.163 Pharmacies wishing to supply a patent-protected medicine must go through the patentee. 
Timing will be a crucial consideration for the courts, including whether a generic has already 
obtained a listing and the life of the patent remaining. Where a drug becomes listed on the 
Pharmaceutical Schedule, evidence of loss of market share upon generic entry can support an 
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argument that the originator has lost substantial market power before patent expiry. It would be 
unusual for a generic to attempt to enter the market or challenge patent validity close to patent 
expiration. It is more likely to challenge an originator's patent and attempt market entry early or 
towards the midpoint of the 20-year term. During this time, an originator is more likely to have 
substantial market power.  
It is highly likely an originator pharmaceutical during the term of its patent has substantial market 
power. Although, this in itself is not illegal, a firm must take advantage of this power for one of the 
proscribed purposes.  
2 Taking advantage 
To breach s 36 a firm with substantial market power must take advantage of that power. First, the 
conduct at issue must be characterised.164 Second, a comparative exercise test must be undertaken, as 
confirmed by the Supreme Court in 0867. It must be shown, on the balance of probabilities, that the 
firm in question would not have acted as it did in a workably competitive market; that is, if it had not 
been dominant. This is a manifestation of the conventional counterfactual test from Queensland Wire 
Industries Pty Ltd v The Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd.165  
The characterisation of the relevant conduct in reverse-payment settlements will be pivotal. In 
Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Ltd the High Court of Australia preferred Heerey J's dissent 
in the Full Federal Court and characterised Melway's conduct as an attempt to maintain its distribution 
system, as opposed to refusal to supply.166 This characterisation enabled the majority to allow the 
appeal and conclude Melway had not taken advantage of its market power.167 In a reverse-payment 
settlement context, conduct may be characterised as paying a generic drug company to delay entry 
into the market or reaching a settlement with a generic drug company to avoid the risks of litigation. 
This characterisation will guide the following analysis. 
The originator pharmaceutical company must lose substantial market power and be placed in a 
hypothetical competitive market. Then, it must be considered whether they would engage in the same 
behaviour. In the context of reverse-payment settlements, a counterfactual analysis is difficult to 
undertake. Stripping the originator of market power would involve removing its patent and the 
accompanying monopoly. Without its patent, patent litigation would never have eventuated and the 
opportunity to settle is nil. The logical conclusion is that without substantial market power the 
originators would not have even had the opportunity to enter into a reverse-payment settlement. 
Furthermore, the rationale for a reverse-payment settlement disappears, leaving a naked market 
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sharing or capacity withholding agreement.168 On a literal application of the counterfactual test, an 
originator would be taking advantage of its substantial market power since it would not have acted as 
it did if it were in a competitive market. Asking whether the originator would have acted in the same 
way in a competitive environment requires constructing a factually inaccurate and artificial situation. 
A way around this issue would be to introduce competitors, all with their own patents and slightly 
different products which nonetheless compete.  
A mere settlement is unlikely to satisfy the take advantage test, as this conduct may have been 
undertaken in a competitive market.169 Any presumption of illegality pertains to unnecessary 
harshness on settlement parties and would "unduly chill patent infringement settlements".170 The 
Court in 0867 adopted the legitimate business rationale test as part of the comparative exercise.171 
The High Court of Australia in Boral Besser Masonry Ltd originally proposed the test.172 If a firm 
gives legitimate reasons for its conduct, this suggests a firm without substantial market power would 
engage in the same conduct in a competitive market. The Privy Council in Carter Holt Harvey 
Building Products Group Ltd v Commerce Commission also approved the legitimate business 
rationale.173  
The requisite taking advantage may be the originator's ability to pay a large sum to the generic to 
delay entry which is connected to its financial strength and monopoly in the relevant drug market.174 
Financial strength does not necessarily equate to market power.175 However, where the originator's 
financial strength is intimately linked with a patent monopoly, its ability to persuade the generic to 
discontinue litigation and settle is otherwise related to it taking advantage of its substantial market 
power.176 It is only by virtue of its control of the market and absence of other manufacturers that an 
originator can financially afford a reverse-payment settlement with a generic. Otherwise, an originator 
earning less than monopoly profits will not recoup the large settlement sum. In a market with existing 
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competitors, an originator has no incentive to preserve its monopoly and keep other generics out of 
the market.  
Evidence of the financial size of the settlement will either be an accurate representation of 
potential damages awarded and saved litigation costs or it will point towards an arbitrary and 
exaggerated reverse-payment. Evidence of the latter will undermine any suggestion the settlement 
was a legitimate business decision and a viable one for a firm without market power. Conversely, a 
court should be aware of a patent holder's extreme risk-averse activities, which may also explain a 
disproportionate settlement. 
There are legitimate reasons for entering into a reverse-payment settlement unrelated to a 
defendant's market power. As the majority recognised in Actavis, a reverse-payment may be 
compensation for other services the generic company performed.177 These services might include 
distributing the patented product or contributing to the development of a market for that product.178 
This will require a court to examine other clauses in the agreement and look for a rationale behind an 
exaggerated payment. Another justification is where an originator and generic wish to avoid scrutiny 
triggered by a reverse-payment all together.179 In such a case, they reverse the apparent direction of 
payment by having a generic promise to pay the patentee for the right to be a distributor.180 This is 
similar to sharing revenues as a royalty. There is both the absence of a reverse-payment and the fact 
of early generic entry, which should easily satisfy the Actavis rule of reason approach. Similarly, a 
settlement containing an exclusive distributor provision is unlikely to amount to taking advantage of 
the originator's market power, as such arrangements are regularly entered into in competitive 
markets.181 A settlement which largely matches expected litigation costs and merely prevents entry 
until patent expiration, is conduct a firm in a competitive market would have undertaken. The main 
difference is the effect of such conduct.  
A critical flaw with the counterfactual test is that an originator with substantial market power can 
pass the test even if the effect of its behaviour when carried out by a company with market power, 
damages the competitive process.182 The test ignores the fact that consequences of the same conduct 
practised by a firm with market power will be different when compared to a firm without it. The 
prohibition ought to cover conduct with the purpose or effect of harming the competitive process.183 
  
177  Actavis, above n 87, at 2236. 
178  Eisenberg and Crane, above n 19, at 240. 
179  At 240. 
180 At 240. 
181  Downie, above n 17, at 110. 
182  Donal Curtin "Abuse of market power: the end of 'make-believe' analysis?" (paper presented to the New 
Zealand Association of Economists Conference, Auckland, 30 June 2016) at 6. 
183 At 8. 
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The analysis will echo that of s 27 where the effects of such settlements are to be considered. This 
includes a plaintiff demonstrating that the settlement amount or provisions are unjustified and the 
potential enforceability of the patent is low.  
3 Proscribed purpose 
Demonstrating an originator took advantage of its substantial market power for one of the 
proscribed purposes in s 36 is likely to encounter similar obstacles. An exclusive distributer 
arrangement will likely fall outside this test where parties can demonstrate the exclusivity 
arrangements foster efficiencies and/or build commercial relationships between parties.184 
Where a reverse-payment settlement delays generic entry into the market beyond the term of the 
patent, this may amount to conduct designed to prevent a generic engaging in competitive conduct in 
that market. This satisfies two of the three proscribed purposes in s 36. Where payments exceed the 
value of the patent, a court may also infer an anticompetitive purpose.185 
V CONCLUSION 
Absent empirical evidence as to their frequency or content in New Zealand, anticipating how New 
Zealand competition law will treat reverse-payment settlements is highly speculative. Given the 
diverse nature of such agreements, the Commission will have the full arsenal of Commerce Act pt II 
restrictive trade provisions at its disposal in testing the legality of reverse-payment settlements in New 
Zealand.  
This article has reached the following conclusions:  
(1) The conventional SSNIP test used by New Zealand courts to define the market is of limited 
utility in the unique pharmaceutical context. 
(2) Assessing anticompetitive effects of a reverse-payment settlement, under s 27, is impossible 
without a court inquiring into the original patent validity or infringement dispute. 
(3) A reverse-payment settlement will only infringe s 27 where the likelihood of success in a 
patent validity or infringement action is low and/or where the settlement restricts entry 
beyond the scope of the patent. 
(4) Section 36 will not catch an originator who enters a settlement preventing generic entry until 
patent expiry, despite it having anticompetitive effects on the market. This is fundamentally 
flawed and gives weight to the argument an "effects-based" approach should replace the 
counterfactual inquiry.  
Parties should be required to lodge reverse-payment settlements with the Commission. This would 
take a change in statute. This recommendation mirrors that of Australia's Productivity Commission, 
  
184  Downie, above n 17, at 111. 
185  Actavis, above n 87, at 2237. 
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which acknowledges that the lack of settlements and evidence are a reflection of poor monitoring 
arrangements, rather than absence of such activity. A monitoring arrangement would deter and detect 
such behaviour.  
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